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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that the pass-through of cost shocks to prices is very low,
and delayed. This is in stark contrast with the standard framework of monopolistic
competition used in macro models, which, absent nominal rigidities, implies complete
pass-through of cost shocks to prices. This paper develops a model of pricing dynamics
in business to business relationships where incomplete pass-through arises endogenously.
The model is based on two assumptions. First, both retailers and wholesalers invest
resources to form new, long-term, business relationships. Second, once a business rela-
tionship is formed, the prices and the quantities of the intermediate good exchanged are
set in a bilateral bargaining between wholesalers and retailers. The repeated nature of the
interactions between rms raises the question of whether wholesale prices are allocative.
We show that wholesale prices still play an allocative role in the model, but this role is
likely to be quite limited.
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1 Introduction
A number of empirical studies documents that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed
through to prices at the rm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs1.
This is in stark contrast with the standard framework of monopolistic competition used in
macro models, the one developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which implies a complete pass-
through of cost to prices. There are many theoretical reasons proposed as to why prices are
more stable than marginal costs2. The most recent literature, trying to explain the low pass-
through to prices of exchange rate shocks, has mainly focused on three factors: the existence
of local distribution costs, markup adjustments (due, for instance, to a variable elasticity of
demand), and pure nominal rigidities (menu costs).
In this paper we propose a novel explanation based on the presence of product market
imperfections in the relationship between wholesalers and retailers.3 In our model incom-
plete pass-through arises endogenously as a consequence of two key assumptions. First, both
retailers and wholesalers spend resources to form new long term business relationships. Sec-
ond, once a business relationship is formed, the wholesale prices and the quantities of the
intermediate good exchanged are determined in a bilateral bargaining between wholesalers
and retailers.
There is a vast empirical evidence on the importance of business to business (B2B) long
term relationships and product market imperfections. For example, Blinder et al. (1998) nd
that, in the US, 85% of rms surveyed engage mainly in long term relationships with their
customers, and that 77% of their customers are other rms. These long-term relationships
are mainly covered by contracts, and these contracts typically last one year. Surveys for other
industrialized economies usually corroborate these ndings (See e.g. Fabiani et al. (2006) for
the Euro Area or Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden). As noted by Matha and Pierrard (2011)
rms allocate a non-negligible amount of resources in the search of customers or suppliers.
The need for advertising, marketing, promotions etc. provided almost 600,000 jobs in 2006
in the US. This represents almost 0.5% of total US employment. A similar amount of people
were engaged in purchasing and buying occupations. Moreover, total annual expenditure in
all media advertising represents on average 2,5% of US GDP over the last decade.
Negotiations among retailers and wholesalers seem to be the rule rather than the excep-
tion. Zbaracky et al. (2004) nd that customer communications and price negotiation costs
account for almost 75% of the total price adjustment cost and are 20 times bigger than the
size of the menu costs. Fabiani et al. (2006) nd, on the basis of surveys conducted by
nine Eurosystem national central banks, that the existence of implicit and explicit contracts
with customers is considered as the most important explanation for rigid prices. Friberg and
1See, for instance, Hellerstein (2008) for the beer industry, Nakamura and Zerom (2010) for the co¤ee
industry, Goldberg (1995) for the automobile industry and Kadiyali (1997) for the photographic industry.
2Examples include implicit contracts, social customs, customer markets and theories of countercyclical
markups (See, e.g., Ball and Romer (1990) and the references therein).
3The model can also be interpreted in terms of relationships between upstream and downstream rms.
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Wilander (2008) report that the invoicing currency for export is predominantly set through
a negotiation between the exporter and the importer.
Very recent ndings of Nakamura (2008), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Nakamura
and Zerom (2010) suggest that delayed pass-through mostly occur at the wholesale rather
than at the retail level. Nakamura (2008) studies a large panel data set of retailers in the
US to analyse the pass-through of costs to wholesale and retail prices. Her results suggest
that most of the observed price variation arises from retail-level4 rather than manufacturer-
level demand and supply shocks: wholesale prices seem to be more sticky than retail prices.
Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) review the closed and open economy empirical literature on
real rigidities and reveal a consistent nding across studies: the variable markup channel for
real rigidities plays little role for retail prices but appears to be quite important for wholesale
prices.5 Nakamura and Zerom (2010) study the pass-through of commodity price shocks in
the co¤ee industry. They nd that both for wholesale and retail prices, a 1% increase in co¤ee
commodity costs lead to an increase in prices of approximately 0.3% over the subsequent 6
quarters. This again indicates that the majority of incomplete pass-through arises at the level
of wholesale prices. Based on these ndings, they argue that "it is wholesale price rigidity
that matters" and that "studies that focus exclusively on retail prices may be incomplete in
an important way".6
In this paper we investigate the implications of B2B long term relationships and bargain-
ing for the response of prices and quantities to cost shocks. The central element of the model
is the introduction of search and matching frictions ala Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides in
the relationship between wholesalers and retailers. Following Matha and Pierrard (2011),
we assume that both retailers and wholesalers face search and matching costs to form new
business relationships. Wholesalers invest resources (marketing, advertising and sale man-
agers) to nd new customers; retailers produce e¤ort (purchase agents) to form new business
relationships with wholesalers. The total amount of trade of intermediate goods depends on
two margins: an extensive margin (the number of customers) and an intensive margin (the
quantity exchanged in each match). The presence of search costs governs the response of the
extensive margin and creates a surplus related to each business relationship. Retailers and
wholesalers bargain over this surplus and set wholesale prices and quantities according to
their relative bargaining power.
We show that the model, despite its simplicity, has the potential to explain the low and
delayed pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale and retail prices. Incomplete pass-through
stems from two main features. On the one side, the presence of search frictions implies that
rms nd it di¢ cult to rapidly adjust the production and distribution process to shocks, as
4Temporary sales are the main determinant of these variations.
5After reviewing the literature, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) use unpublished international price data and
exchange rate shocks to evaluate the importance of real rigidities in price setting. They show that the pass-
through of import prices to exchange rate shocks, even conditionally on changing, is very low and delayed.
This suggests the presence of important real rigidities in the wholesale sector.
6Nakamura and Zerom (2010), p. 1193.
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to increase production they need to establish new business relationships, which is a costly
and time-consuming process. As a consequence retail prices and quantities do not change as
easily as in a frictionless world. On the other side, the introduction of bilateral bargaining
between rms implies that the responsiveness of wholesale prices to shocks depends crucially
on the negotiation capabilities of the parties involved.
More generally, we nd three factors to be crucial in explaining the degree of pass-through
to wholesale and retail prices: (1) the relative bargaining power of retailers in the negotia-
tions, (2) the persistence of the cost shock and (3) the elasticity of the demand of retailers for
wholesale goods along the intensive margin. Interestingly, while retailersbargaining power
has a strong and monotonic e¤ect on the pass-through to wholesale prices, its inuence on
retail prices and consumption is rather limited. The reason is that bargaining power mainly
a¤ects the distribution of the rents related to a business relationship, while the reaction of re-
tail prices ultimately depends on the costs of rapidly adjusting the marketing and distribution
infrastructure needed to sell the nal goods.
The repeated nature of the interactions between rms points towards an intriguing issue:
observed wholesale prices may not be allocative, in the sense that they may not a¤ect the
retail prices faced by consumers nor their consumption decisions. This issue is very relevant,
especially at the light of the recent empirical evidence, which suggests that nominal price
stickyness arises mainly at the wholesale rather than at the retail level. As recognized at
least since Barro (1977), in fact, the stabilizing role of monetary policy when prices are
sticky crucially depends on prices being allocative. The business to business model provides
a natural laboratory to address this issue.
We show that wholesale prices have no direct inuence on the intensive margin of trade,
but a¤ect the value of business relationships and thus the incentive to engage in search
activities. For this reason, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the perceived
persistence of the price change, and on the e¢ ciency of the matching process. If wholesale
price changes are long-lasting and search externalities are substantial, then wholesale prices
still retain a large, and very persistent, allocative role. In all the other circumstances, the
allocative power of wholesale prices is likely to be small, much smaller than in the standard
monopolistic competition model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
In Section 3 we derive the benchmark model. In Section 4 we analyse the e¤ect of trading
frictions and bargaining on the pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale and retail prices.
Based on the ndings, Section 5 addresses the issue of the allocative power of wholesale prices.
Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Related literature
Recent research has started to investigate the role of long term relationships in the interaction
between rms and customers. Notable examples are Hall (2008), Arseneau and Chugh (2007),
Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) and Ravn et al. (2010). Hall (2008) develops a model of
consumerssearch and seller recruiting where rms invest heavily in advertising in order to
attract nal consumers. He focuses on the magnitude and distribution of the rents associated
with customer relationships and on the tightness of the retail markets under alternative
distributions of the rents. Arseneau and Chugh (2007) derive a similar model of retailer-
consumer relationships and explore the e¤ects of di¤erent bargaining assumptions. They
show that in the presence of search frictions prices play a distributive as well as an allocative
role, and explore how concerns for fairness inuence price dynamics. Both Hall (2008) and
Arseneau and Chugh (2007) focus on the relationship between nal consumers and rms, and
not on business to business relationships between rms, as we do here. This is conceptually
an important di¤erence, since a bilateral bargaining between rms is arguably more realistic
than between retailers and consumers.
Of these papers, the ones more closely related to ours are Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009)
and Ravn et al. (2010), as they both provide theoretical explanations of the low pass-through
of cost shocks to prices. Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009) construct a model in which rms
care about the size of their consumer base, because consumers incur costs to switch sellers.
Consequently, rms face an intertemporal trade-o¤ between increasing current prots and
building market shares for the future. Ravn et al. (2010) provide a theoretical explanation
of the incomplete pass-through of marginal costs disturbances to prices based on a relative
deep-habit demand for retail goods. When habits are formed at the level of individual goods,
following a cost increase rms nd it optimal to narrow prots margins in the current period
to limit the decline in future habitual demand triggered by the price increase. Kleshchelski
and Vincent (2009) and Ravn et al. (2010) share with our approach the idea that rms form
long-term relationships, but di¤er in two key respects: they focus on retail rms-consumer
relationships, and do not allow for bilateral negotiations between buyers and sellers.
From a modeling perspective, our paper builds on the work of Drozd and Nosal (2010)
and Matha and Pierrard (2011). Drozd and Nosal (2010) propose an international business
cycle model where international trade takes place only through matches between retailers and
producers. The model is found to perform well in replicating the movements of international
prices and quantities. Matha and Pierrard (2011) extend a standard real business cycle model
allowing for search and matching frictions between rms and bargaining. They investigate
the cyclical properties of such a model, and nd that this is able to produce hump-shaped
dynamics for all variables, a highly persistent output and a realistic representation of the
product market variables such as search and prices. The present paper di¤ers from Drozd
and Nosal (2010) and Matha and Pierrard (2011) on three main dimensions. First, we study
a di¤erent issue, as we investigate the implications of business to business relationships and
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bargaining for pricing dynamics and for the allocative power of wholesale prices. Second, we
focus on industry dynamics. This approach has the advantage of analytical tractability and
allows a closer match with the empirical literature on cost pass-through. Finally, we carefully
analyse the e¤ect of the intensive margin of adjustment on pricing dynamics, unveiling its
crucial role in explaining the degree of pass-through of cost shocks to prices.
More recently, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) developed a static bargaining model be-
tween one nal good producer and a number of intermediate good suppliers. The model is
used to provide a micro-foundation for a quantitative model with variable markups at the
wholesale level but constant markups at the retail level. Our paper shares with Gopinath
and Itskhoki (2010) the idea that introducing negotiations between rms is important to
understand pricing dynamics, but di¤ers in many important aspects. Most importantly, our
model is dynamic, and takes into account the need for rms to invest in building new long
term business relationships.
3 The model
In this section we develop a tractable model of business to business relationships where
rms invest in long term relationships and set prices by bargaining. We focus on a generic
industry where goods are produced by wholesalers, transformed by retailers and consumed by
households. Retailers sell the nal good to consumers in a perfectly competitive environment.
Trade frictions are present in the relationship between wholesalers and retailers. The model
builds on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model and adapts its basic
concepts to business to business relationships.
3.1 Demand for retail goods
The economy is composed of a continuum of sectors, each producing a good indexed by
i. In each sector, there is an innite number of retail rms, each selling a di¤erent brand
r. Following Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009), we assume that while goods i are imperfect
substitutes, brands are homogeneous and perfectly substituable.7
The demand for the good produced in industry i is given by
cit =

pit
Pt
 
Ct
where  is the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in di¤erent industries.
Pt and Ct denote respectively the aggregate price and consumption levels. Following Ravn
et al. (2010), since we focus on industry dynamics taking as given Pt and Ct, we simplify the
demand function for the good i to:
ct = A (pt)
 
7 In this paper we use the term sector and industry interchangeably.
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where A is a positive constant. Notice that in the rest of the paper, to simplify the notation,
we drop the industry superscript i.
3.2 Wholesale rms
The industry is composed of a continuum of wholesale rms. In order to sell their products,
wholesale producers need to establish customer relationships with retailers. We assume the
aggregate number of business to business relationships in the industry, Tt, follows the law of
motion:
Tt+1 = (1  ) (Tt +Mt)
where  is the rate at which business relationships are destroyed, which we take as exogenous.
Mt, the number of new B2B relationships, is a constant return to scale function of the search
e¤ort of retailers dt (e.g., from purchase managers) and the search e¤ort at (advertising and
marketing) by wholesalers:
Mt = ~ma

td
1 
t
where ~m > 0. Total trade volumes depend on the number of relationships Tt (extensive
margin) and the units bought for each relationship qt (intensive margin). Wholesalers take
as given kat =
Mt
at
= ~m (t)
 (1 ), the number of new matches per unit of e¤ort. t = atdt is
the product market tightness of industry i, dened as the ratio of advertisement e¤ort per
purchasing e¤ort.
Firms are assumed to discount future prots at the constant rate  2 (0; 1)8. The law of
motion of the customer base for wholesaler j is:
Tt (j) = (1  )
 
Tt 1 (j) + at 1 (j) kat 1

(1)
Notice that Tt (j) is a state variable, as it takes time (one month, under our calibration) to
establish a business relationship. The marginal cost of producing one intermediate variety,
mct (j), is assumed to be exogenous and independent of scale. Moreover, wholesale rms face
a search cost to establish new business relationships that is convex in the search intensity of
wholesalers xwt (j) =
at(j)
Tt(j)
:9

2
(xwt (j))
2 Tt (j)
8 In a full-edged general equilibrium model, the discount factor of the rm would be an endogenous
variable given by the representative households intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. See also Ravn et
al. (2010).
9This specication of search costs, which has been used in the labor search literature by Gertler and Trigari
(2009) and Thomas (2008), greatly simplies the bargaining problem because it implies that the bargained
price does not depend on the number of B2B relationships that each rm has in place. It thus permits to
avoid the problem that in labor economics is known as intrarm bargaining.
6
Wholesalers maximize the expected present value of future prots10
E0
1X
t=0
t
n
[pWt (j) mct (j)] qt (j)Tt (j)  
2
(xwt (j))
2 Tt (j)
o
subject to the law of motion of the customer base (1). At the beginning of the period the
rm chooses the advertising e¤ort xwt (j); wholesale prices pWt (j) and quantities qt (j) are
decided after the successful match in a bilateral bargaining between wholesalers and retailers.
The solution to the maximization problem gives the following rst order conditions:

xwt (j)
kat
=  (1  )EtWt+1 (j) (2)
Wt (j) = [pWt (j) mct (j)] qt (j) + 
2
(xwt (j))
2 +  (1  )EtWt+1 (j) (3)
The rst condition equates the expected search cost of an additional match (the left hand
side), to its expected benet, which is given by the expected value of a business relationship.
Wt (j) is the value of an existing business relationship for a wholesale rm, which consists of
the total prot from an established relationship, plus the savings in the costs of establishing
a new match, 2 (xwt (j))
2, plus the expected continuation value. Notice that the introduction
of search frictions transforms the wholesale problem into an intertemporal problem, as both
the search intensity and the value of an existing relationship depend on the expected future
value of a business relationship.
3.3 Retail rms
In sector i, there is a continuum of retailers buying tradable goods from wholesalers and
selling them to households. As wholesalers, retailers choose at the beginning of the period the
amount to invest in forming business relationships, captured by the search rate xRt (r) =
dt(r)
Tt(r)
.
Retailers take as given the rate at which search e¤ort leads to a new match, dened as:
kRt =
Mt
dt
= ~mt
and the search cost to establish new matches, that is convex in the search intensity xRt (r):

2
(xRt (r))
2 Tt (r)
Once matched with wholesalers, each retailer r has a technology which transforms whole-
sale goods into retail goods. It is important to specify at this point that in order to introduce
a meaningful intensive margin of adjustment, we need to introduce a cost of changing the
quantity sold per match. If changing qt (r) were costless, rms would nd it optimal to
have few matches (since it is costly to establish long-term relationships) and satisfy changes
10Notice that we implicitely assume symmetry among the matches of each wholesaler j.
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in demand with changes in qt (r). This would go against the spirit of our model, which is
meant to be one in which rms must engage in search and matching in order to expand their
production, and would make the problem not well-dened.
To address this aspect, we introduce costs in changing the quantity sold per match through
the production function of retailers. Specically, we assume that for each match k, retailers
have a technology that transforms qt (k) units of the wholesale good into (qt (k)  !t (k))
units of retail goods, where !t (k) =
 
2 (qt (k)  q)2 is an adjustment cost in the units bought
per match. Intuitively, q is the quantity per match that maximizes the technical e¢ ciency
of the production process of retailers. Deviations from this optimal amount decrease the
marginal productivity of the intermediate good variety. The aggregate production of retailer
r is thus given by:11
yt (r) =
Tt(r)Z
0
(qt (k)  !t (k)) dk
= (qt (r)  !t (r))Tt (r) (4)
where we have imposed symmetry among matches. This production function has three main
attractive features. First, it displays diminishing returns to qt for deviations from the tech-
nically optimal level q both upwards and downwards. Second, it introduces an incentive for
retailers to buy from di¤erent wholesalers (similar to a love for varieties). Third and most
importantly, it is very exible, in that it includes both the linear case and the extensive-
margin-only case as special cases. More precisely, for  ! 0, the production function is
linear in qt (k) and retailers can adjust their production on the intensive margin very easily.
For  !1, qt (k) = q for all t, the intensive margin is closed, and rms can adjust production
only by establishing new business relationships.
Each retailer maximizes the expected present value of future prots
E0
1X
t=0
t
n
ptyt (r)  pWt (r) qt (r)Tt (r)  
2
(xRt (r))
2 Tt (r)
o
11A natural alternative would be to endogenize the intensive margin by assuming that each retailer buys
di¤erentiated goods from a range of wholesalers and has a love of variety motive (common in the trade
literature) that leads him to value buying from many wholesalers in itself. The production function of retailers
would be:
yt =
24TtZ
0
qitdi
351=
with  < 1. The main reason why we chose a di¤erent specication is that the production function (4) is more
exible, since it nests both the linear case ( ! 0) and the extensive-margin-only case ( ! 1) as special
cases. This allows us to analyse more neatly the role of the intensive margin of trade adjustment for the cost
pass-through.
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subject to the law of motion of the customer base
Tt (r) = (1  )
 
Tt 1 (r) + dt 1 (r) kRt 1

(5)
and the production function (4). Notice that since retail rms sell the nal good in a perfectly
competive market, they take the nal price of the retail good, pt, as given in the maximization
problem. The solution to the problem gives:

xRt (r)
kRt
=  (1  )EtJt+1 (r)
Jt (r) = pt (qt (r)  !t (r))  pWt (r) qt (r) + 
2
(xRt (r))
2 +  (1  )EtJt+1 (r)
The rst condition equates the expected search costs of an additional match, to its ex-
pected benet, which is given by the expected value to a retailer of a business relationship.
The second equation determines the value of a business relationship for a retailer, Jt (r), which
consists of the gross prots from an established relationship pt (qt (r)  !t (r)) pWt (r) qt (r),
plus the savings in the costs of establishing a B2B relationship, plus the expected continuation
value.
3.4 The bargaining problem
The presence of a surplus associated with existing long-term relationships implies that many
wholesale prices and quantities are consistent with equilibrium (see, e.g., Hall 2005, 2008).
Existing B2B relationships are privately e¢ cient as long as they generate a positive surplus for
both the parties involved in the bargaining. Therefore, any price path such that Wt (j)  0
and Jt (r)  0 for all t is consistent with equilibrium. This has interesting implications
because, as emphatized by Hall (2007), it admits the possibility of equilibrium sticky prices
in customer markets.12
In this paper, we follow the labor market literature and assume that the surplus sharing
is a solution to a Nash (1950) bargaining problem. In Nash bargaining, each wholesaler j
and retailer r jointly choose wholesale prices and quantities to maximize the Nash product
St (j; r) according to their relative bargaining power:
St (j; r) =
h
(Wt (j))
1  (Jt (r))
i
where  is the bargaining power of retailers. The solution to the maximization problem with
respect to the wholesale price gives the optimal sharing rule
Wt (j) = (1  ) Jt (r) (6)
12See also Blanchard and Galì (2010) for a similar argument in the context of a labor search model. Arseneau
and Chugh (2007) exploit this insight and analyse the implications of di¤erent pricing schemes on the price
dynamics in a model with consumer search.
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which implies:
pWt (j; r) =  fmct (j)  
Wt (j; r)g+ (1  )

pt

1  !t (j; r)
qt (j; r)

+
Rt (j; r)

(7)
where 
Wt (j; r) =

2
(xwt(j))
2
qt(j;r)
and 
Rt (j; r) =

2
(xRt(r))
2
qt(j;r)
are the savings per unit in the costs
of forming a business relationship for wholesalers and retailers respectively.
The wholesale price depends not only on the costs of producers, but also on the valua-
tion of retailers. The bargained price is a weighted average between two terms. The rst,
mct (j)  
Wt (j; r), represents the minimum amount that wholesalers are willing to accept,
which depends on marginal costs and on the savings in the cost of forming another business
relationship. The second term, pt

1  !t(j;r)qt(j;r)

+ 
Rt (j; r), represents the maximum price
that retailers can accept, which is the sum of the marginal revenue obtained in the retail
market and the savings in the costs of establishing another B2B relationship for retailers.
The weights on the two terms depend on the bargaining power of the two parties. If whole-
salers have no bargaining power ( = 1), retailers get the entire surplus from a business
relationship and pWt (j; r) is strictly related to marginal costs. Vice versa if wholesalers have
all bargaining power ( = 0), they get all the surplus from a relationship and pWt (j; r) follows
closely the evolution of retail prices.
The optimal sharing rule (6) also implies:


kat
xwt (j) = (1  ) 
kRt
xRt (r)
Aggregating across all rms, this gives, in terms of log deviations:
a^t = d^t and ^t = 0
The assumption of complete symmetry between the search problem of wholesalers and re-
tailers thus implies a one to one relationship between changes in search e¤ort by retailers
d^t

and wholesalers (a^t). As a consequence, the product market tightness ^t is invariant to
marginal cost shocks.13
While the bargained price is set in a way to split the surplus between the two parties in
proportion to their bargaining power, wholesalers and retailers choose qt (j; r) in a way to
maximize the total surplus from a long term relationship. Specically, the solution of the
maximization problem with respect to quantities gives:
pt (qt (j; r)  q) = pt  mct (j) (8)
which states that the marginal benet of an additional unit sold in the retail market, which
is given by the total prot margin pt   mct (j), needs to be equal to the marginal cost of
13The bargaining power shock that we study in Section 5 will break this tight link.
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increasing the quantity per match qt (j; r) above q, which is an increasing function of the
adjustment cost parameter  .
To get further intuition, we can rewrite (8) as:
qt (j; r) = q +
1
 

tott (j; r)  1
tott (j; r)

(9)
where tott (j; r) =
pt
mct(j)
is the total gross mark-up of retail prices over marginal costs. The
volume of trade per match is an increasing function of the total prot margin of retailers and
wholesalers. As long as tott (j; r) > 1, the bargained qt (j; r) is set above q because retailers
and wholesalers agree on a production strategy that exploits the market power related to the
presence of search frictions. More importantly, notice that, since wholesalers and retailers
decide together qt (j; r) in order to maximize the total surplus of a match, the units traded
in each match depend directly on the nal retail price but are set independently from the
wholesale price. This rises the important question of whether wholesale prices play a role in
the allocation of resources in the economy; a question to which we will return later.
3.5 Aggregations
Industry level relations are found by aggregating across all retailers r and wholesalers j under
the assumption of complete symmetry across rms. For instance, the aggregate consumption
of the nal good of industry i is:
ct =
24 1Z
0
ct (r) dr
35 = A (pt)  = yt =
24 1Z
0
yt (r) dr
35
All other equations are identical to the individual rms case and are therefore not re-
peated here.
3.6 Search externalities and the constrained e¢ cient allocation
In a decentralized equilibrium, wholesalers and retailers decide their search intensity taking
as given kat and k
R
t , the rates at which additional e¤ort leads to a new match. Each rm
thus sets its optimal amount of search without internalising the e¤ects on other rms, with
the result that the sum of all individual decisions is conducive to an aggregate suboptimal
outcome.
The constrained e¢ cient allocation can be found by solving the problem of a benevolent
social planner who faces the same technological constraints and search frictions that are
present in the decentralized economy. The solution of the social planners problem leads to
the following result, which is further explained in the appendix14.
14To derive the constrained e¢ cient allocation in a partial equilibrium setup, we follow Hosios (1990). See
also Matha and Pierrard (2011) for a similar analysis in a general equilibrium setting.
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Proposition 1 The decentralized equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient only if the Hosios con-
dition  = 1   holds.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 1 requires that each rms social and private gain from participating in the
matching process be equal. When the retailersbargaining power, , is larger than the elas-
ticity of the matching function with respect to retailers search activities, 1   , retailers
private gains from participating into the matching process are too large, and retailers overin-
vest in forming new business relationships, while wholesalers underinvest in it. The opposite
happens for  < 1 . Only when  = 1  rms internalize the congestions that they create
in the product market in a way that leads to an e¢ cient matching process.
3.7 The mark - up in the long run
The presence of search frictions makes the mark-up endogenous and time varying. If we
dene the gross mark-up of the retail price over marginal production costs as tott =
pt
mct
, its
long run level is an increasing function of the search costs of retailers and wholesalers
tot =
q
(q   !) +

mc (q   !)

~b
xw
ka
+
xR
kR

 

x2w
2
+
x2R
2

where ~b = f1 (1 )g(1 ) and, for reasonable calibrations,
n
~b
 
xw
ka +
xR
kR
  x2w2 + x2R2 o > 0.
Notice that, because of product market imperfections, wholesalers and retailers enjoy a mark-
up even though nal goods are perfect substitutes. As we show in the following section, this
mark-up is decreasing in the steady state value of q while it is concave in the bargaining
power of retailers .
The gross surplus from an existing relationship is split between retailers and wholesalers
according to their relative bargaining power. Wholesalers get:
W =
pW
mc
= 

1  x
2
w
2mcq

+ (1  )

p
mc
(q   !)
q
+
x2R
2mcq

which is increasing in the bargaining power of wholesalers (1  ), while retailers get
R =
p
pW
=
tot
W
which is increasing in .
3.8 Calibration and steady state
The model is calibrated at the monthly frequency. The discount rate  is 0:996. The elasticity
of substitution across industries is set to the standard value  = 6, as in Ravn et al. (2010).
The parameter determining the adjustment costs along the intensive margin is set to  = 1:
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The elasticity of the matching function to the marketing e¤ort by wholesalers, , and the
bargaining power of retailers, , are set to 0:5, which imply complete symmetry between
wholesalers and retailers. We choose the e¢ ciency of the matching technology ~m so that the
monthly rate at which search e¤ort leads to new business relationships is kR = 0:2: This rate
corresponds, approximately, to a quarterly rate of 0:5, the value used by Matha and Pierrard
(2011). The separation rate  is 0:10, which implies a quarterly rate slightly higher than the
value  = 0:25 used by Matha and Pierrard (2011). The search e¤ort parameter  is chosen
such that, under the baseline calibration, the total mark-up on the nal good is 1:10. This
gives a value  = 0:3457.
Two crucial parameters in the determination of the steady state are  , which captures
the curvature of the demand of retailers for the variety produced by each wholesaler, and
, which represents the bargaining power of retailers. Table 1 shows how the steady state
changes for di¤erent values of these parameters.15
Consider rst the impact of the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. For  =
100000 the intensive margin is closed, q = q = 1 and the total markup of retail prices over
marginal costs is 10:5 percent. Lowering  to 1 the model displays both an intensive and an
extensive margin of adjustment. Firms optimally trade-o¤ the costs of increasing production
along the extensive margin (paying the search and matching cost) with the costs of increasing
production along the intensive margin. The steady state stock of business relationships
decreases while the quantity sold per match increases to q = 1:091 > q. The higher q
depresses prices and markups, which are now (slightly) smaller. If we set the adjustment
costs  close to zero ( = 0:00001) rms lose any incentive to engage in B2B relationships,
as they nd it optimal to have very few matches and satisfy changes in demand with changes
in qt. The steady-state stock of B2B relationships goes down to T = 0:007 while the quantity
per match goes to q = 144:50. The increase in q depresses prices and reduces markups, which
are now close to zero. This demonstrates the need to have some frictions along the intensive
margin in order to explain why rms spend resources in building business relationships.
Consider now the role of the bargaining power of retailers, . In the baseline calibration,
wholesalers and retailers have the same bargaining power ( = 0:5), the number of B2B
relationships is relatively high, and the total mark-up on a nal product is around 10 percent.
Intuitively, since in the market there are many buyers and many sellers searching for new
customers ( = ad = 1), the product market is uid and this facilitates the formation of new
matches. Technically, the fact that we impose the retailersbargaining power to be equal to
the elasticity of retailerssearch intensity in the matching function, i.e.  = 1   , implies
that the search externalities are internalized and that the matching process is Pareto e¢ cient.
As soon as we move  away from 1    = 0:5, the stock of business relationships decreases
while the quantity exchanged per match and the total mark-up tot increase. This higher
15To perform the steady state analysis, we set  = 0:3457 as in the baseline calibration, and let the number
of B2B relationships, the units sold per match and the wholesale and retail prices adjust endogenously to
changes in  and .
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mark-up reects the ine¢ ciencies in the matching process. When wholesalers have most of
the bargaining power ( = 0:1), they get most of the surplus from a business relationship
and have a strong incentive to invest in advertising and marketing activities. At the same
time, the incentive of retailers to spend resources in searching new suppliers is very low. As
a consequence, the product market is very tight( = 3), the process of matching becomes
sclerotic and the steady state number of B2B relationships decreases. Something similar -
even though on the opposite side of the market - happens when retailers have most of the
bargaining power ( = 0:9). Interestingly, the assumption of complete symmetry between the
search problem of retailers and wholesalers implies that symmetric deviations from  = 0:5
upwards and downwards have identical e¤ects on the stock of relationships and on the nal
retail price. The main di¤erence lies in the evolution of the wholesale price: when  is high,
wholesale prices are low and most of the prots go to retailers; when  is low, wholesale prices
are high and wholesalers get most of the rents.
4 Trading frictions, bargaining and pass-through
The pass-through of marginal cost shocks is complete if a one percent increase in marginal
costs leads to a 1 percent increase in prices; otherwise, if prices increase less than marginal
costs, the pass-through is said to be incomplete. To determine whether in our model pass-
through is incomplete, we characterize the impulse responses of wholesale and retail prices
to innovations in the marginal costs of wholesalers. We assume that the marginal cost shock
is industry-specic and follows an AR process of order 1
cmct = cmct 1 + "t (10)
where variables with hat denote log deviations from steady state,  2 [0; 1) is the serial
correlation of marginal costs and "t is an i.i.d. shock.16
We proceed in two steps. We initially restrict attention to purely transitory cost shocks
( = 0), for which it is possible to nd simple analytical solutions. We then study the response
to persistent cost shocks.
4.1 Transitory cost shocks
When the marginal cost shock is purely transitory ( = 0), it is possible to nd a simple
solution to the model, which is summarized in the following proposition.
16Our strategy follows Ravn et al. (2010).
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Proposition 2 If marginal cost shocks cmct are purely transitory, i.e.  = 0, the solution of
the model is:
T^t = 0
q^t =  Bqcmct
y^t = T^t + q^t =  Bqcmct
p^t =   1

y^t =


Bqcmct
p^Wt = 
mc
pW
cmct + (1  ) p (q   !)
pW q
p^t  Aq q^t
=


mc
pW
+ (1  ) p (q   !)
pW q


Bq +AqBq
 cmct
where Bq = 1 totq+

captures the elasticity of q^t to changes in the total prot margin,  =
q
q ! (1   (q   q)) captures the increase in retailersproduction related to an increase in q^t,
and Aq =
n
(1  ) (1  ) p(q !)pW q + (1  )

R
pW
  
WpW
o
2 [0; 1) represents the elasticity of
the wholesale price to changes in q^t.17
Proof. In the Appendix.
The key to understand the previous proposition is to notice that when the shock is ex-
pected to disappear in the future, rms do not have incentives to adjust along the extensive
margin and the problem becomes static (i.e. x^wt = x^Rt = T^t = 0). In this case, the response
of retail quantities and prices depends on the adjustment costs along the intensive margin.
The lower is the adjustment cost  , the easier it is for retailers to adjust their production
and distribution structure, the larger is the elasticity of q^t to changes in cmct. In turn, a
strong reduction in the production of retail goods increases retail prices with an elasticity
that depends on , the elasticity of the demand for the good produced in the industry. Ce-
teris paribus, the lower is , the higher the pass-through to retail prices. The pass-through
to retail prices is complete only if the adjustment along the intensive margin is completely
frictionless, i.e. if  ! 0, otherwise it is incomplete.
Wholesale prices are a¤ected by three channels. First, there is the direct marginal cost
channel, captured by  mcpW in the proposition above. This term captures the direct inuence
of the marginal costs of wholesalers on the bargained price and increases with the bargaining
power of retailers. The second channel is related to the retailers reservation price and is
captured by (1  ) p(q !)pW q Bq. This term is larger, the more retail prices react to cost
shocks or the higher is the bargaining power of wholesalers. The nal term captures the
bargained quantity e¤ectand is represented by AqBq. This term is related to the fact that
wholesalers are willing to o¤er to retailers a lower price if retailers accept to buy more units
of the intermediate good. An increase in marginal costs provokes a reduction in q^t, which
17Bq is decreasing in  and increasing in  and Bq ! 0 if  !1. Aq is decreasing in  and  and converges
to 0 for  !1 and for  ! 1.  is decreasing in  and ! 1 for  ! 0.
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leads, through the bargained quantity e¤ect, to an increase in the wholesale price p^Wt. This
e¤ect is stronger the lower are  and . The combined e¤ect of these three channels implies
that the pass-through to wholesale prices is complete when two conditions are met: (1) when
the adjustment costs go to zero,  ! 0 or (2) when retailers have all the bargaining power,
 ! 1.
Importantly, wholesale prices in this case play only a distributive but not an allocative role.
Notice in fact that the dynamics of the prices and quantities of the retail goods (p^t =   q^t
and y^t = q^t) do not depend on the evolution of wholesale prices, which only play the role of
distributing the rents among wholesalers and retailers.
Corollary When  = 0, we have:
(i) the pass-through to retail prices converges to 1 for  ! 0.
(ii) the pass-through to wholesale prices converges to 1 when one of the following
conditions is met: 1)  ! 0; 2)  ! 1.
(iii) wholesale prices play only a distributive role, not an allocative one.
An interesting special case refers to the situation in which adjustment costs are pro-
hibitively large and intermediate trade can only take place along the extensive margin, i.e.
for  ! 1. In this case, following a purely transitory cost shock the model implies zero
pass-through to retail prices and a pass-through to wholesale prices that is proportional to
the bargaining power of retailers :
p^t = 0
p^Wt = 
mc
pW
cmct
The zero pass-through result stems directly from the presence of search frictions. When
rms can only increase production by forming new business relationships, output becomes
a state variable, that can change only with one month delay. Since through the demand
function there is a one to one relationship between consumption and prices, the presence
of matching frictions prevents consumption and retail prices to move on impact. At the
same time, if the marginal cost shock is completely transitory, rms have no incentive to
create/destroy B2B relationships by changing the search e¤ort level, and they absorb the
shock completely through mark-up movements. The wholesale price shares the burden of the
markup adjustment between wholesalers and retailers according to their relative bargaining
power. Hence, in an environment where rms are hit by idiosyncratic cost shocks, our model
can yield complete price rigidity and time-varying markups.
4.2 Persistent cost shocks
In the previous section we saw that following a transitory shock, rms are reluctant to
engage in costly search activity and prefer to absorb the shock through mark-up adjustments.
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However, when the cost shock is expected to persist over time, the results change considerably.
Table 2 displays the response of marginal costs, prices and mark-ups to a mildly persistent
marginal cost shock ( = 0:5
1
3 ) under our baseline calibration18. To help the comparison with
existing models, we also include in Table 2 the results obtained in a standard Dixit-Stiglitz
model and in the "pricing to habit" model proposed by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010, denoted as R-SG-U in the Table).19
In the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model, prices move one for one with mar-
ginal costs and markups are una¤ected by the disturbance: cost pass-through is complete.
In the "pricing to habit" model, rms increase retail prices but proportionally less than the
increase in marginal costs. The pass-through is incomplete, but still very high, especially on
impact. Incomplete pass-through in Ravn et al. (2010) is the consequence of an intertemporal
tradeo¤: increasing current prices prevents a strong decline of current prot margins but, at
the same time, it leads to a decline in current sales and to a reduction in the stock of habitual
demand, which weakens the strength of future demand.
Pricing dynamics in the B2B model with long-term relationships are quite di¤erent. In
the period of impact, rms reduce both the units sold per match and their advertising and
marketing activities (captured in Table 2 by at). Retail prices increase due to the reduction
of the units sold per match, while the pass-through to wholesale prices is almost proportional
to the bargaining power of retailers. Starting from the second period, the disinvestment in
long term relationships provokes a persistent reduction in the stock of B2B and in the total
production of the industry, which induce a persistent reaction of wholesale and retail prices.
The pass-through to retail and wholesale prices, however, remains quite low, and most of the
cost shock is absorbed through mark up movements.
Notice that the low degree of pass-through to retail prices stands in stark contrast with
both the Dixit-Stiglitz model, where the pass-through is complete, and the "pricing to habit"
model by Ravn et al. (2010), where the pass-through is almost complete. Such a low pass-
through is not far from empirical estimates. For example Hellerstein (2008) nd that, in the
beer industry, rms pass-through an average of 11 percent of a foreign-cost shock to their
retail prices. Nakamura and Zerom (2010) nd that, in the co¤ee industry, the pass-through
of a persistent cost shock to retail prices is around 10 percent in the rst quarter and around
25 percent after six quarters.
4.3 Factors behind low pass-through
What explains such a low pass-through in the business to business model? To answer this
question, we analyze the dynamics of the model following a persistent marginal cost distur-
bance. We focus the analysis on three factors, which are essential to explain the degree of
18The persistence parameter  is chosen such that our results are comparable to the ones obtained by Ravn
et al. (2010).
19All variables are measured in percent deviations from their respective steady-state values. The values for
the "pricing to habit" model are taken by Ravn et al. (2010).
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pass-through to retail and wholesale prices: (1) the relative bargaining power of retailers in
the negotiations, (2) the elasticity of the demand of retailers for wholesale goods along the
intensive margin and (3) the persistence of the cost shock itself.
4.3.1 The role of the persistence of the shock
Figure 1 shows the impact of marginal cost shocks for di¤erent values of the persistence
parameter . The degree of pass-through and - especially - the persistence of the price
increase are strongly increasing in the persistence of the cost shock. The more persistent the
shock is, the larger the incentive for rms to react by reducing the advertising and marketing
e¤ort. If the shock is transitory, rms are reluctant to reduce their advertising and marketing
e¤ort, as they expect costs to go back quickly to their normal level. The response of prices
and consumption is, in this case, very short-lived. If the shock is persistent, rms do not
mind losing business relationships, because cost conditions are expected not to be favorable
for many periods. This causes a strong decline in B2B relationships and consumption, and
induces a strong and persistent increase in retail and wholesale prices.
For the same reason, the persistence of the shock determines crucially whether rms are
willing to absorb the disturbance through the intensive or the extensive margin. When the
shock is temporary, most of the adjustment goes through the intensive margin. The higher
the persistence of the shock, the more the adjustment goes through the extensive margin.20
4.3.2 The role of adjustment costs on the intensive margin
Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of production adjustment costs on the dynamics of the model
following a persistent marginal cost shock. Consistent with the ndings of Nakamura and
Zerom (2010) that cost shocks in the co¤ee industry are highly persistent, we set  = 0:95.21
We present three cases. For  = 100000, rms are allowed to adjust production only along
the extensive margin. For  = 0:1, retailers can adjust production easily along the intensive
margin.  = 1 presents a situation in which rms use both margins to adjust production.
The degree of pass-through to wholesale and retail prices is profoundly a¤ected by the
curvature of retailersdemand on the intensive margin, as captured by  . Pass-through to
wholesale and retail prices is low - and delayed - for medium to high level of adjustment costs
( = 1 or  = 100000) while it increases considerably when adjusting the quantity traded
per match is relatively cheap. The introduction of an intensive margin allows rms to adjust
production much faster to marginal cost shocks and thus increases the responsiveness of retail
prices (and consequently of wholesale prices) to cost disturbances. Notice however that, for
20This is consistent with the empirical evidence of Ruhl (2008), who nds that the extensive margin of trade
responds to permanent but not to transitory shocks.
21Nakamura and Zerom (2010) nd that, in the co¤ee industry, a Dickey-Fuller test for the hypothesis of a
unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level. For simplicity, we focus here on very persistent, but stationary,
cost processes.
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reasonable calibrations, introducing an intensive margin is not enough to generate complete
pass-through: pass-through to retail prices remains below 0:6 even when  = 0:1.22
4.3.3 The role of bargaining power
To understand the e¤ects of bargaining power on the dynamics of the model, Figure 3 draws
the cost pass-through to wholesale and retail prices for di¤erent values of . In the rst graph
of Figure 3 the pass-through is computed as the impact response of prices to a one percent
change in marginal costs. In the second, the pass-through is computed as the response of
prices to a marginal cost shock after one year.
The bargaining power of retailers a¤ects di¤erently the pass-through to wholesale and
retail prices. The pass-through to wholesale prices is increasing in , both on impact and
after one year. The pass-through to retail prices, instead, is non-monotonic in : it is
maximum when the Hosios condition is met, and decreases symmetrically as we move away
from  = 1  :
At rst sight, the idea that the reaction of wholesale prices to shocks to the marginal cost
of wholesalers increases with the bargaining power of retailers may seem counterintuitive.
One may have expected in fact that retailers would force wholesalers to absorb the shock
without changing the bargained price pWt. To shed some light on this result, consider the
evolution of the bargained wholesale price:
p^Wt = 

mc
pW
cmct   
W
pW

^Wt

+ (1  )

p
pW q
(q   !) fp^t   (1  ) q^tg+ 
R
pW

^Rt

The wholesale price depends on the reservation price of wholesalers and the reservation price
of retailers. When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power, i.e. for  ! 0, they get
most of the surplus from a business relationship and the wholesale price becomes strictly
related to the retailersvaluation of the wholesale good. At the limit, marginal cost shocks
do not a¤ect, at least directly, wholesale prices. When retailers have most of the bargaining
power, i.e. for large values of , the wholesale price becomes strictly related to the marginal
cost of production of the wholesale good, mcpW cmct. The reaction of wholesale prices to marginal
cost shocks is in this case much stronger. At the limit, for  ! 1 we have mcpW = 1 and the
pass-through to wholesale prices is complete.
The pass-through to retail prices depends instead on how easy it is to adjust production
along the intensive and extensive margins:
p^t =   1


T^t + q^t

The bargaining power  a¤ects p^t only through its e¤ects on the e¢ ciency of the matching
22 In our model there are two ways to achieve complete pass-through to both retail and wholesale prices.
The rst way is to eliminate the curvature on q, i.e. let  ! 0. The second way is to eliminate search frictions,
i.e. let  ! 0.
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process and thus on T^t. The inverted-u shape is explained by the presence of search exter-
nalities.23 When  = 1   = 0:5, the search externalities are internalized and the matching
process is Pareto e¢ cient. The large variation along the extensive margin is what leads to
a larger pass-through to retail prices. When retailers have most of the bargaining power
( = 0:9), instead, the product market is tight, the process of matching is sclerotic and the
variation along the extensive margin is more expensive. Similarly, when wholesalers have
most of the bargaining power ( = 0:1), too many sellers chase too few buyers. Overall, how-
ever, the e¤ect of  on the pass-through to retail goods is small compared with its e¤ect on
the pass-through to wholesale prices. This raises again questions about the allocative role of
wholesale prices in our model.
5 Are wholesale prices allocative?
The previous results point towards an interesting issue: observed wholesale prices may not
be allocative, in the sense that they may not a¤ect the nal prices faced by consumers nor
their consumption decisions. This issue is likely to have important policy implications, given
that, as rst recognized by Barro (1977), the stabilizing role of monetary policy when prices
are sticky crucially depends on prices being allocative.
In our model, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the persistence of
the price change. When the price change is purely transitory, wholesale prices play only a
distributive but not an allocative role. When the price change is expected to last into the
future, instead, wholesale prices potentially play an allocative role on top of the distributive
role. This happens because the incentives for rms to engage in costly search activities depend
on the expected benets of a B2B relationship, which are in turn inuenced by the future
expected wholesale price. The questions that remain to be addressed are: how does it work,
and how big is this allocative role of wholesale prices?
To answer these questions, we analyse the response of retail prices and nal consumption
following an exogenous increase in wholesale prices. In the B2B model, this shock has a
nice natural interpretation, as it can be interpreted as a shock to the bargaining power of
the parties. In fact, the introduction of a bargaining shock ^t in the model only a¤ects the
evolution of the wholesale price, which is now determined as
p^Wt = 

mc
pW
cmct   
W
pW

^Wt

+ (1  )

p (q   !)
pW q
(p^t   (1  ) q^t) + 
R
pW

^Rt

 A^t
where A = JpW q f1   (1  )g.24 An increase in the bargaining power of wholesalers
(i.e. a reduction of ^t) raises p^Wt and is thus equivalent to an exogenous shock to wholesale
23See Figure 4.
24Notice that the persistence of the bargaining power shock  reduces, ceteris paribus, the response of
wholesale prices to the bargaining power shock. This is a consequence of the repeated nature of the interactions
between rms which leads rms to take into account, in the negotiations, the expected continuation value of
a match. Retailers, for instance, are willing to accept a higher wholesale price today if they expect to get a
20
prices.
Figure 5 compares the e¤ects of wholesale price increases in the B-2-B model with the
ones obtained in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model. ^t is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process with persistence  = 0:95. In order to facilitate the comparison
of the results, in the B2B model the bargaining shock is scaled such that, independently of
the calibration, wholesale prices increase by one percent on impact, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) model.25
In the standard monopolistic competition model, an increase in wholesale prices lead
to a proportional increase in retail prices (the pass-through is complete) and to a strong
reduction in nal consumption y^t. In the B2B model, instead, the response of retail prices and
consumption depends crucially on the initial conditions of the product market, as captured
by the initial bargaining power of retailers, . When wholesalers have most of the bargaining
power ( = 0:1), the increase in wholesale prices leads to a reduction in consumption and
an increase in retail prices, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. On the contrary, when retailers
are the dominant party in the negotiations ( = 0:9), an increase in wholesale price induces
an increase in consumption and a reduction of retail prices - the opposite than in the Dixit-
Stiglitz model. Finally, under complete symmetry ( = 0:5) wholesale price shocks do not
a¤ect neither retail prices nor nal consumption, i.e. they do not play any allocative role.
These, perhaps surprising, results are explained by the search externalities in the prod-
uct market. A persistent increase in wholesale prices raises the expected value of business
relationships to wholesalers while reduces the one to retailers. For this reason, wholesalers
increase their search intensity while retailers reduce it; but the strength of these responses
changes with the initial bargaining power of the parties. When wholesalers have most of the
bargaining power ( = 0:1 < 1   ), the product market is very tight on the side of whole-
salers, and the bargaining power shock only worsens the situation, leading to a drop-out of a
signicant fraction of searching retailers. The formation of new matches is strongly reduced,
and is only partially o¤set by the increase in the units sold per match. Total consumption
decreases and the pass-through to retail prices is positive, but delayed. On the contrary, when
wholesalers are the weak party in the negotiations ( = 0:9 > 1 ), the wholesale price shock
reduces the tightness of the market, and improves the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The
number of business relationships increases, leading to an increase in consumption and to a
reduction of retail prices. When the Hosios condition is veried ( = 0:5 = 1  ), the addi-
tional search e¤ort by wholesalers exactly o¤set the reduction of retailerssearch e¤ort, and
the stock of business relationships, nal consumption and retail prices are una¤ected.26
high share of the surplus in the future.
25To determine the response of prices under monopolistic competition, notice that in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
model the pass-through of wholesale price shocks to retail prices is complete, i.e. p^t = p^Wt. Consumption is
then obtained using the sectorial demand condition c^t =  p^t =  p^Wt: The evolution of wholesale prices,
p^Wt, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is modeled as an AR(1) process with persistence . This is identical to the
evolution of p^Wt in the B-2-B model when  = 0:5.
26See also Figure 6.
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These results suggest two conclusions regarding the allocative power of wholesale prices.
First, persistent wholesale price changes still retain some signalling power also in the presence
of long-term contracts and e¢ cient bargaining, but this e¤ect works entirely through the
incentives for rms to engage in costly advertising and purchasing activities. For this reason,
the e¤ect is considerably delayed and much more persistent than in the standard monopolistic
competition model. Second, the e¤ect of wholesale price changes depends on the presence
and evolution of search externalities: when  < 1    wholesale price changes lead to an
increase in retail prices and a reduction in nal consumption, as in the standard monopolistic
competition model; when  > 1   , instead, an increase in wholesale prices reduces retail
prices and increases nal consumption.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model of pricing in business relationships based on the
presence of dynamic frictions of building long term contracts. The model is based on two
assumptions with strong empirical support: First, rms need to spend resources in forming
new long term relationships in order to expand trade. Second, rms bargain over the prices
and quantities of the intermediate good exchanged. Despite its simplicity, the model has
the potential to explain both the low and delayed pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale
prices, and the almost complete pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices. Moreover,
the model is a natural laboratory to address questions related to the allocative power of
wholesale prices in the presence of long term contracts. Our results suggest that wholesale
prices still retain some allocative power into the model, but this e¤ect works through a
di¤erent channel - the incentive to invest in new long term relationships - and it is likely to
be small unless shocks are very persistent, and search externalities are large.
Our analysis can be extended along several dimensions. For instance, it would be inter-
esting to incorporate negotiation costs into the bargaining problem, or allow for infrequent
negotiations. This would be coherent with the evidence that most contracts among rms
have a duration of 1 year, and would naturally lead to real e¤ects of nominal shocks. More-
over, the model can be easily incorporated in full-edged general equilibrium models. This
would allow us to study how long-term contracts and bargaining between rms a¤ect the
dynamics of modern economies. Finally, it would be interesting to extend the model to an
open economy setting, by assuming for instance that home wholesalers trade with both home
and foreign retailers. It is straightforward to show that the presence of trade frictions and
bargaining set the stage for pricing to market and can explain wide and persistent deviations
from the law of one prices, both in the long run and in the short run.27
27Results are available on request. See also Drozd and Nosal (2010).
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Steady State Analysis
T q  p pW 
R W tot
Adjustment costs
 = 100000 0.551 1.000 1.000 1.105 1.052 1.050 1.052 1.105
 = 1 0.519 1.091 1.000 1.100 1.048 1.050 1.048 1.100
 = 0:00001 0.007 144.50 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001
Bargaining power
 = 0:1 0.358 1.140 3.000 1.163 1.138 1.022 1.138 1.163
 = 0:5 0.519 1.091 1.000 1.100 1.048 1.050 1.048 1.100
 = 0:9 0.358 1.140 0.333 1.163 1.015 1.145 1.015 1.163
Table 1: Adjustment costs, bargaining power and the steady state
Month mct Dixit -Stiglitz R-SG-U (2010) B2B Model
pt t pt t pWt Wt pt Rt qt Tt at
0 1 1 0 0.99 -0.01 0.57 -0.43 0.11 -0.46 -0.74 0 -1.27
3 0.5 0.5 0 0.36 -0.14 0.30 -0.20 0.10 -0.21 -0.34 -0.28 -0.67
6 0.25 0.25 0 0.13 -0.12 0.17 -0.08 0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.35 -0.36
9 0.125 0.125 0 0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.33 -0.19
Table 2: Persistent marginal cost shock and pass-through
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Figure 1: Persistence and pass-through
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Figure 2: Intensive margin and pass-through
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Figure 3: Bargaining power and pass-through
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Figure 4: Bargaining power and the response to a persistent marginal cost shock
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Figure 6: Response to a persistent wholesale price shock in the B-2-B model
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Appendix
A. Constrained E¢ cient Allocation
To derive the constrained e¢ cient allocation in a partial equilibrium setup, we follow Hosios
(1990). We dene the constrained e¢ cient allocation as the optimal allocation a social planner
may achieve as a market equilibrium28. This allocation can be found by solving the problem of
a benevolent social planner who faces the same technological constraints and search frictions
that are present in the decentralized economy. The implicit assumption is thus that the
social planner is not able to circumvent the search frictions required to form a match; he can
however internalize the e¤ect of variations in product market tightness on search costs and
on the resource constraint.
Proposition 1 The decentralized equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient only if  = 1  (Hosios
condition).
Proof. The social planner chooses fyt; qt; Tt; at; dtg to maximize
max
fyt;qt;Tt;at;dtg
E0
1X
t=0
t
(
ptyt  mctqtTt   
2

dt
Tt
2
Tt   
2

at
Tt
2
Tt
)
(11)
subject to the technological constraints on the extensive (matching frictions) and intensive
margin (adjustment costs):
Tt = (1  )

Tt 1 + ~ma

t 1d
1 
t 1

yt =
 
qt    (qt   q)
2
2
!
Tt
Notice that in (11) we have used the fact that, given symmetry in preferences and technology,
e¢ ciency requires that identical quantities of each good be produced by each wholesaler and
retailer. The social planner problem gives the following rst order conditions:
pt (qt   q) = pt  mct (12)
 t = pt
 
qt    (qt   q)
2
2
!
 mctqt + 
2
x2Rt +

2
x2wt +  (1  )  t+1 (13)
xWt
~m
 (1 )
t
=  ((1  ))  t+1 (14)
xRt
~mt
= (1  ) (1  )  t+1 (15)
where  t captures the social value of a match. We can now compare it with the rst order
28See also Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
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conditions of the decentralized solution, which can be rewritten as:
pt (qt   q) = pt  mct (16)
 t = pt
 
qt    (qt   q)
2
2
!
 mctqt + 
2
x2wt +

2
x2Rt + (1  ) t+1 (17)
xWt
~m
 (1 )
t
=  (1  )Wt+1 = (1  ) (1  )  t+1 (18)
xRt
~mt
=  (1  ) Jt+1 =  (1  )  t+1 (19)
where  t = Wt + Jt. Comparing (12)   (15) with (16)   (19), it is easy to show that the
condition 1   =  is necessary and su¢ cient for the equivalence of the constrained e¢ cient
and the decentralized solution.
B. The benchmark model in log deviations
The model is solved log-linearizing around the steady state. The resulting system of equation
can be reduced to the following:
 Wholesale prices
p^Wt = 

mc
pW
cmct   x2wt
pW q
x^Wt

(20)
+(1  )

p (q   !)
pW q
p^t +
x2R
pW q
x^Rt

 Aq q^t
where Aq =
n
(1  ) (1  ) p(q !)pW q + (1  )

R
pW
  
WpW
o
.
 Bargained quantities
q^t =
1
 
mc
pq
(p^t   cmct) = 1
 
mc
pq
 
^tott

(21)
 Law of motion business to business relationships:
a^t   (1  ) ^t = 1

T^t+1   (1  )

T^t
 Market clearing condition
 p^t = T^t + q^t = y^t (22)
where  = qq ! (1   (q   q)).
 Product market tightness and search intensities
^t = a^t   d^t = k^Rt   k^Wt = x^Wt   x^Rt
x^Wt = a^t   T^t
x^Rt = d^t   T^t
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 Wholesalers: search condition
x^Wt   k^Wt = x^Wt + (1  ) ^t = EtW^t+1
 Retailers: search condition
x^Rt   k^Rt = x^Rt   ^t = EtJ^t+1
 Wholesalers: value of a match
WW^t = pW qp^Wt  mcqcmct + (pW  mc) qq^t + x2wx^Wt + (1  )WEtW^t+1
 Retailers: value of a match
JJ^t =  pW qp^Wt + p (q   !) p^t + x2Rx^Rt + (1  )JEtJ^t+1
  (pW q   p (q   !)) q^t
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the complete log-linearized model in Appendix B. If the marginal cost shock is
purely transitory, i.e.  = 0, it is possible to nd recursively a relatively simple solution to
the model. When the shock is purely transitory, in fact, it does not a¤ect the expected future
value of a business relationship and thus wholesalers and retailers do not have incentives to
vary their search intensity (x^wt = EtW^t+1 = x^Rt = EtJ^t+1 = 0). This in turn implies that
the number of B2B relationships is not a¤ected by the shock (T^t = 0). In other words, a
purely transitory shock does not lead to intertemporal substitution and the model becomes
static.
From (22) we can write:
p^t =   1


T^t + q^t

=  

q^t (23)
where  = qq ! (1   (q   q)) captures the curvature of the production function of retailers
with respect to q^t. Introduce (23) into (21) to get:
q^t =
1
 
mc
pq
(p^t   cmct) =  Bq (cmct) (24)
where Bq =
q
1+

q
captures the elasticity of q^t to changes in the total prot margin and
q =
1
 totq is a decreasing function of  .
Using this, we get
p^t =  

q^t =


Bq (cmct) (25)
where Bq is decreasing in  and .
Finally use (24) and (25) into (20) to get:
p^Wt =


mc
pW
+ (1  ) p (q   !)
pW q


Bq +AqBq
 cmct
where Aq captures the elasticity of wholesale prices to changes in q^t, and is decreasing in  .
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